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i. neW DeCADe, neW LeADeRSHiP, oLD CHALLenGeS
A. Credibility at oFPP. In preparing these materials, it was surprising to realize that – most 
likely – this is only the second time in two decades in which the new Administrator of the Office of 
Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP), at the time of his/her appointment, was a familiar name to this 
community; nor can we recall a prior appointee who had regularly participated in this conference. 
Personally, we’re ecstatic with the appointment and confirmation of Daniel Gordon – formerly the 
Acting General Counsel of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) – as OFPP Administrator. 
See, generally, OFPP Nominee Will Prioritize the Acquisition Workforce, 51 GC ¶ 398. We remain 
disappointed by the administration’s delay in filling this critical position; but we were pleasantly 
surprised (nay, flabbergasted) by the Senate’s pre-Thanksgiving acceleration of the process for this 
obviously qualified, uncontroversial candidate. We may not understand why he was willing to accept 
the job, but we’re grateful that he did. He has got his work cut out for him. 
B. Still Waiting at GSA. At least Dan Gordon is on the job. Martha Johnson’s nomination to be 
the next administrator of the General Services Administration (GSA) remains on hold. Ed O’Keefe, 
Key Positions Vacant as Nominees Await Senate Confirmation, Wash. Post (Dec. 31, 2009) (“Among 
executive branch nominees, Martha N. Johnson [nominated in May] has waited the longest.”)
C. Continuing, Daunting Challenges. In all fairness, the Obama Administration inherited a 
public procurement regime stretched to the breaking point and under siege. Four trends appear to 
dominate that procurement landscape:
(1) the dismantling of the acquisition workforce: the 1990’s workforce reductions rendered 
succession planning impossible, increased future risks associated with the pending retirement 
bubble, and left the government unprepared for the recent period of dramatically increased 
purchasing (and, of course, more on this below);
(2) failure to acknowledge or adapt to two decades of seismic changes:
a. the government evolved from primarily purchasing supplies into an insatiable con-
sumer of services, specifically including professional and personal services; and 
b. robust “new public management” initiatives empowered government purchasers to 
embrace commercial practices, employ flexible contracting vehicles, and, ultimately, 
change business methods in an effort to maximize value for money received and cus-
tomer satisfaction;
(3) the post-millennium spending binge (more on this below); and 
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(4) the inevitable result: scandal and criticism (more on this below 
as well).
D. The obama Administration Procurement Agenda: Lots of 
Sail, Minimal Rudder? The most remarkable trend of 2009 was the 
Obama administration’s overall approach to procurement policy. Despite 
dragging its heels on installing a leadership team, the administration 
charted a course of what it perceived as bold action – most dramatically, 
touting “savings” and accountability, while permitting special interests to 
distract focus from value for money and customer satisfaction. Accordingly, 
to date, the Obama administration’s procurement policies lack a cohesive 
theme, suggest a reactive rather than proactive approach, strongly indicate 
a special interest bias, and, at best, have sent mixed messages at a critical 
juncture. For a more optimistic, aspirational assessment, see David Nadler 
& Joseph Berger, Feature Comment: President Obama Heralds Change 
for Government Contracting, 51 GC ¶ 19.
An early nod to Special interests. Faced with financial and 
economic crises, distracted by military action in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
and engaged in a high-stakes debate over the future of health care, the 
nascent Obama Administration – not surprisingly – did not focus its 
resources on establishing its procurement leadership team. Nonetheless, 
shortly after the inauguration, the administration issued three pro-
labor Executive Orders that affect the federal procurement process. Gil 
A. Abramson & David W. Burgett, Feature Comment: Executive Orders 
Change Labor Rules for Federal Contractors, 51 GC ¶ 34 (“Making good 
on his campaign promises to help organized labor, … President Obama 
signed three union-friendly executive orders pertaining to federal con-
tractors.”); Executive Orders, Economy in Government Contracting (Janu-
ary 30, 2009), www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/economy_in_govern-
ment_contracting; Nondisplacement of Qualified Workers Under Service 
Contracts (January 30, 2009), www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/
nondisplacement_of_qualified_workers_under_service_contracts; and 
Notification of Employee Rights Under Federal Labor Laws (January 
30, 2009), www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/notificiation_of_em-
ployee_rights_under_federal_labor_laws. A week later, in early February, 
a fourth pro-labor Executive Order followed. Executive Order, Use of 
Project Labor Agreements for Federal Construction Projects (February 
6, 2009), www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ExecutiveOrderUseof-
ProjectLaborAgreementsforFederalConstructionProjects. This presaged a 
willingness to deploy the procurement process to achieve targeted wealth 
distribution (favoring, for example, domestic manufacturers, small busi-
nesses, and labor, implicitly at the expense of taxpayers, large businesses, 
foreign firms, etc.). We would have preferred the administration’s initial 
proclamations on public procurement to focus on “value for money” and 
end-user “customer satisfaction.”
The March Memorandum. In early March, a Presidential memoran-
dum on “Government Contracting” described concerns with recent trends 
in outsourcing, cost-reimbursement contracting, and insufficient competi-
tion. The memorandum suggested (and the President’s speeches stated) 
that remedying these perceived pathologies would generate significant 
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savings. The memorandum also highlighted “contracts that are wasteful, 
inefficient, subject to misuse[.]” See, Office of Federal Procurement Policy 
Briefing Room - Presidential Memorandum on Government Contracting, 
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/procurement_index_gov_contracting/; David 
Nadler & Joseph Berger, Feature Comment: Government Contracting 
Developments in President Obama’s First 100 Days—‘No Little Plans”, 
51 GC ¶ 143 (“President Obama has set his priorities for broad goals to 
be achieved through Government contracts and grants, charted a course 
for Government contract reform, and provided billions of dollars in new 
opportunities for contractors. Congress has responded to the president’s 
agenda with its own series of initiatives, resulting in a deluge of develop-
ments….”); James J. McCullough & William S. Speros, Feature Comment: 
The Obama Administration’s Emerging Policies on Freedom of Information, 
Transparency and Open Government—New Benefits And Costs for Govern-
ment Contractors?, 51 GC ¶ 125 (“Government contractors likely will need 
to expend additional effort to protect their confidential and proprietary 
information; … [this] will certainly entail increased transaction costs for 
contractors …, which, in turn, will likely lead to increased contract prices 
for procuring agencies.”); Paul Debolt, Rob Burton & Terry Elling, Feature 
Comment: President Obama Issues Memo on Government Contracting to 
the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 51 GC ¶ 77 (“Govern-
ment must … issue ‘tough new guidelines….’ [T]he president described 
the procurement system as “broken” and stated that the Government has 
lost the public trust. … [C]oncerns … highlighted by the president were 
fraud, massive cost overruns, contractors overseeing other contractors, 
and a lack of oversight and accountability.”); OMB Issues Contracting 
Reform Guidance, 51 GC ¶ 384 (“The president directed OMB and federal 
agencies to develop guidelines to achieve goals intended to save up to $40 
billion each year.”).
We remain unconvinced by the dramatic rhetoric promising savings; 
nor do we believe that the system is capable of generating credible data 
demonstrating or validating the promised positive results. See, e.g., Office 
of Management and Budget, Acquisition and Contracting Improvement 
Plans and Pilots: Saving Money and Improving Government (December 
2009), www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/reports/2009_acquisition_con-
tracting_improvement.pdf (“President Obama believes that taxpayers 
deserve to have their dollars spent wisely. To help instill a new sense of 
responsibility … he has charged federal departments and agencies with 
saving $40 billion annually by Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 through terminating 
unnecessary contracts, strengthening acquisition management, ending the 
overreliance on contractors, and reducing the use of high-risk contracts 
across government.”) For example, we are concerned that deferring neces-
sary expenditures to later fiscal years may be confused with savings and 
that aspiration may not comport with reality. “DoD expects to get a new 
presidential helicopter ‘for a lot less money than the cancelled program 
would have cost had it continued.’” USD AT&L Addresses KC-X Procure-
ment, JSF at Media Roundtable, 51 GC ¶ 417.
The July Memos: Less Flash, More Substance. In late July, the 
administration expanded upon these policies by issuing memoranda 
that: (1) mandated savings and advocated reduced use of high-risk con-
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tracting vehicles (such as non-competitive and/or cost-reimbursement 
contracts); (2) provided guidance to help agencies improve their man-
agement of the multi-sector workforce (a more constructive approach 
to the earlier anti-outsourcing rhetoric); and (3) injected rigor into the 
government’s ineffective process for obtaining, managing, and employing 
contractor performance data. OMB Issues Contracting Reform Guid-
ance, 51 GC ¶ 271; Peter R. Orszag, Improving Government Acquisi-
tion, Office of Management and Budget (M-09-25, July 29, 2009), www.
whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/memoranda_fy2009/m-09-25.pdf; Peter 
R. Orszag, Managing the Multi-Sector Workforce, Office of Management 
and Budget (M-09-26, July 29, 2009), www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/
memoranda_fy2009/m-09-26.pdf; Lesley A. Field, Improving the Use of 
Contractor Performance Information (July 29, 2009), Office of Federal 
Procurement Policy, www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/procurement/
improving_use_of_contractor_perf_info.pdf. 
And even More executive orders. By October, Green Procure-
ment had become a priority, adding layers of complexity to a broad range 
of acquisitions. Mary Beth Bosco, Feature Comment: Executive Order on 
Environmental and Energy Performance Changes Government Acquisi-
tion of Buildings and Services, 51 GC ¶ 363 (“[T]the policy … shall be to 
‘leverage agency acquisitions to foster markets for sustainable technolo-
gies and environmentally preferable materials, products, and services,’ 
and ‘design, construct, maintain, and operate high performance sustain-
able buildings in sustainable locations.’” The “executive order can be 
broken down into four mandates: (1) establishment of greenhouse-gas 
percentage emissions goals; (2) articulation of specific action goals; (3) 
designation of responsibility in the Government for implementing the 
order’s requirements; and (4) recommendations for siting and operation 
of Government buildings.”). In November, President Obama issued an 
executive order intended to help agencies reduce improper payments. 
President Issues Executive Order To Reduce Improper Payments, 51 
GC ¶ 416 (requiring agencies to reduce payment errors and eliminate 
waste, fraud and abuse in federal programs while ensuring that proper 
beneficiaries continue to have access to federal programs and funds); 74 
Fed. Reg. 62201 (November 25, 2009).
A Telling Anecdote. The administration’s optimism suggests that 
the Government can have it both ways. In pursuing initiatives to stimu-
late a stalled economy with government spending, the administration 
mandated increased transparency and oversight in public procurement 
(and government, generally) and reiterated concerns regarding contrac-
tor compliance. (At the same time, the administration seems to favor 
targeted allocation of procurement benefits to special interest groups.) 
That is all fine, if there is some recognition of the source of the problems 
that lead to contractor compliance failures that underlie the account-
ability concerns. We found it particularly disingenuous, for example, that 
the administration acknowledged a profound, generational deficiency in 
the acquisition workforce, yet promised a massive spending (stimulus) 
splurge to be simultaneously accompanied by higher – previously unprec-
edented – levels of oversight and accountability. OMB Issues Stimulus 
Implementing Guidance, 51 GC ¶ 60. 
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ii. HoW LonG CAn THe UPWARD TRenD ConTinUe? THe 
PoST-MiLLeniUM, PRoCUReMenT SPenDinG BinGe 
SPAnS THe DeCADe
A. The Burn Rate Keeps Burning. Throughout the past decade, 
we continued to be surprised by the increased volume and rate of federal 
procurement spending. The experts swore that the growth would taper, 
and, to some extent, the growth rate did slow somewhat, but not for long. 
In retrospect, the dire warnings that the current spending increase was 
a blip – and that procurement spending would promptly retract – were 
unfounded. Has the growth cycle finally run its course?
Federal Procurement Spending 2000-2009*
Fiscal 
Year
Procurement Spending (in 
Billions)  
FPDS v. USASpending
Percentage Increase 
From Previous Year
Percentage Increase 
in Consumer Price 
Index (CPI)
2009  $409.7* 1.8
2008 $531.2 $529.8 >11.5 3.8
2007 $465.6 $463.1 12.0 2.8
2006 $415.4 $426.6 6.6 3.2
2005 $389.6 $385.9 8.9 3.4
2004 $357.7 $341.2 9.6 2.7
2003 $326.4 $297.8 18.6 2.3
2002 $275.2 $258.9 17.0 1.6
2001 $235.2 7.2 2.8
2000 $219.3
*FY 2009 reflects preliminary reporting.
See Federal Procurement Data System, Trending Analysis Report, 
available at www.fpdsng.com/downloads/top_requests/FPDSNG5Year-
ViewOnTotals.xls, and Agencies Submitting Data to FPDS-NG, available 
at www.fpdsng.com/downloads/agency_data_submit_list.htm. See also, 
USASpending.gov. Annual increases in the Consumer Price Index for All 
Urban Consumers (CPI-U) were extracted from the annual Detailed Re-
port Tables, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://
www.bls.gov/cpi/cpi_dr.htm#2009. 
We recognize that this run of increases will end, and defense budgets, 
in particular, eventually will come down. It probably will not happen in FY 
2011, but it will occur soon thereafter. Whether defense budgets start com-
ing down next year or later is irrelevant. What’s important is that neither 
Congress nor the DoD is ready to deal with declining defense budgets. See, 
generally, David J. Berteau, Statement before the House Armed Services 
Committee, Resourcing the National Defense Strategy: Implications of 
Long-Term Defense Budget Trends (November 18, 2009); see also David 
J. Berteau, Current Issues: No. 19: Fixing the Shortfalls: Defense Budget 
Trends and Long Term Impact (12/14/09), CSIS, Defense-Industrial 
Initiatives Group, http://csis.org/publication/diig-current-issues-no-19-
fixing-shortfalls-defense-budget-trends-and-long-term-impact. 
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B. Data Quality: incremental improvement. Due in large part 
to the introduction of USASpending.gov, the procurement spending data 
that the public enjoys access to continues to improve, but it remains far 
from perfect.
[GAO’s] William Woods … testified that deficiencies in the 
current systems involve mainly poor data quality, lack of data 
submission and inadequate system capabilities. … [OMB 
Watch’s] Adam Hughes … agreed that the current systems do 
not deliver accurate, timely and useful information. He called 
them “disjointed, antiquated, at times redundant, and extremely 
difficult to use.” … Vivek Kundra, OMB’s federal chief information 
officer, testified that the Obama administration recognizes the 
problems with the current contractor databases, including data 
timeliness, accuracy and completeness, and system usability.
Senate Subcommittee Examines Contracting Databases, 51 GC ¶ 345. Con-
sider, for example, that the government still lacks a means for quantifying 
money actually spent on contracts, as opposed to the amount of dollars 
awarded. And all of these numbers, of course, exclude grants. Although 
the volume of government funds dispersed annually on grants exceeds 
that spent through contracts, grant spending remains less transparent 
and subject to far lesser scrutiny. All things in time.
iii. enoUGH oUTSoURCinG, ConTRACTinG oUT, AnD 
PRivATizATion: A neW inSoURCinG TRenD?
Last year, we noted that the government’s bipartisan outsourcing (or, 
at times, “competitive sourcing”) initiative had spanned more than fifteen 
years (and two two-term administrations). This year, insourcing is all the 
rage. Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn, at the recent Aerospace 
and Defense Conference in New York, conceded that DoD lacks sufficient 
expertise and proficiency in cost estimating, systems engineering, and 
program management. Lynn described “rebalancing” the federal and con-
tractor workforces as a key element of overall acquisition reform.
The outsourcing versus insourcing debate has solidified itself as a 
mainstream topic of public discourse. On the one hand, we’re pleased to 
see issues related to public procurement penetrating the public conscious-
ness. Conversely, we remain concerned that the public does not like what 
it is seeing about our profession and/or industry.
It is easy to see things have gone awry and to scapegoat 
contractors. But contractors aren’t the problem; the problem is 
the loss of good government….
If regular government channels are inadequate to handle the 
biggest challenges the nation faces, it is hard to avoid concluding 
that something is terribly wrong with our current national 
security infrastructure….
[T]here can be bad privatization and good privatization and 
government can ensure that the latter prevails. Bad privatization 
empowers the beltway bandits….
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Allison Stanger, one natIon Under ContraCt: the oUtsoUrCInG of amerI-
Can PoWer and the fUtUre of foreIGn PolICY, 11, 60, 133 (Yale University 
Press, 2009) (emphasis added).
[C]riticism about America’s foreign policy being outsourced to 
the private sector has resurfaced with a vengeance....
Sure, government needs to be better at managing contractors. 
Sure, it needs to bring certain skill sets … back into government. 
And sure, we could always use even more transparency on 
government spending. Yet … the devil is in the details…. 
More importantly, the critics … have yet to present an analysis 
showing how the costs of contracting outweigh the benefits. They 
warn of contracting run amok and the privatization of foreign 
policy but seemingly forget that in times of war, meeting the 
warfighters’ needs in a timely manner is a primary task of the 
government, even if this costs more than we would like it to. And 
… critics … should also recognize that having a private sector 
that can surge in support of expeditionary operations increases 
the nation’s ability to project power and the credibility of its 
deterrence.
Guy Ben-Ari, Current Issues: No. 18: Addressing Concerns About US 
Foreign Policy Outsourcing (12/02/09), CSIS, Defense-Industrial Initia-
tives Group, http://csis.org/files/publication/ 091202_DIIG_Current_is-
sues_n18.pdf.
We remain unpersuaded by much of the insourcing rhetoric. We also 
sense that much of the insourcing activity, particularly at DoD, is quota-
driven, rather than results-oriented. No doubt, the picture will be more 
clear by this time next year.
iv. ACQUiSiTion WoRKFoRCe: FinALLY, SoMe ACTion 
Last year, we were pleased that the acquisition workforce was increas-
ingly, and seriously, addressed—both as a matter of policy and legislation. 
(We apologize here for attempting to summarize the well-traveled tale 
that brought us to this point. The federal acquisition workforce declined 
dramatically due to congressionally mandated personnel reductions in 
the 1990’s. We agree with those who assert that the government has not 
hired an appropriate number of new acquisition professionals in any year 
since the 1980’s. A disproportionate share of the existing workforce is 
aging and, in large part, retirement-eligible; and most of that workforce 
was neither hired nor trained to primarily purchase services using flex-
ible contractual vehicles. In addition, as discussed above, the volume of 
purchasing exploded during this decade.) 
Now that the trends are not only documented, but, increasingly, ac-
knowledged, we are starting to see meaningful action. OFPP Nominee 
Will Prioritize the Acquisition Workforce, 51 GC ¶ 398; Treasury IG Finds 
Insufficient Training for Recovery Act Oversight, 51 GC ¶ 375 (We were 
not surprised to see, e.g., “an internal memorandum [that] indicated that 
additional contracting staffing was ‘not required for execution of remain-
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ing acquisitions’ under the Recovery Act. … [A]lthough the Recovery Act 
increased the contracting workload, the increase was ‘accommodated ... 
primarily by reprioritizing non-Act procurements and working additional 
hours.’” Sound familiar?); Acquisition Workforce Competencies Rise As 
Retirement Threat Looms, FAI Survey Shows, 51 GC ¶ 288; Senate Sub-
committee Focuses On Acquisition Workforce Reform, 51 GC ¶ 280; DoD 
Seeks Better, More Acquisition Professionals, 51 GC ¶ 259 (DoD’s Shay 
Assad touts 20,000 new acquisition employees by 2015; Schooner responds 
that the number is too low, and the movement is too slow.); Experts Tell 
House Subcommittee About Federal Contracting Challenges, 51 GC ¶ 213 
(Karen Manos highlighted the Government’s “overworked, under-trained 
and underappreciated acquisition workforce”); DPASS and Service Up-
date HASC Subcommittee on Acquisition Workforce, 51 GC ¶ 150 (“[DAU] 
must be expanded because certification requirements have exceeded its 
capacity, and the joint contracting workforce must be properly sized and 
trained to meet contracting needs in a battlefield environment”); DOD 
Needs Additional Information To Manage Acquisition Workforce, GAO 
Says, 51 GC ¶ 117.
As Vern Edwards correctly articulates, the numbers game is only part 
of the problem:
 [T]he problem is not just quantity, but also quality. It is an 
open secret that the current workforce is not entirely up to the 
job of conducting contracting operations efficiently, effectively 
and in compliance with the law. … COs do not fully understand 
the Government’s complicated rule system and rely too much on 
agency attorneys to tell them the rules. … 
 The hiring surge is injecting many people into a system that 
is not ready to receive them or to develop and retain first-rate 
professionals. ...
 [T]he Government’s primary approach to workforce 
revitalization, which is to overwhelm the workload problem with 
numbers, will result in needlessly higher labor and training 
costs, suboptimal worker performance and suboptimal retention 
rates among the best new hires.
 FAI and DAU must be revitalized. They need new 
management and more money. …The quality of the educational 
institutions should reflect the quality of the new hires, who have 
more formal education than the current generation. The new 
educational programs must be intellectually sophisticated and 
professionally rigorous….
Vernon J. Edwards, Feature Comment: Throwing People at the Problem – 
Massive Hiring Will Not Revitalize the Acquisition Workforce, 51 GC ¶ 288. 
We share Vern’s concern that new personnel must be properly trained, 
allocated, mentored, incentivized, and, over time, developed. We also are 
curious to see if results stem from the nascent Strategic Partnership on 
Acquisition Recruitment Coalition (SPARC), comprised of representatives 
from the OFPP, the Chief Acquisition Officers Council, the Federal Acqui-
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sition Institute (FAI), the Defense Acquisition University (DAU), and the 
National Contract Management Association (NCMA). We are optimistic 
that the partnership can persuade institutions of higher learning to expand 
their curriculum to include procurement-related coursework. We are also 
encouraged, on this score, by the Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act 
of 2009 (“[t]o improve the acquisition workforce through the establishment 
of an acquisition management fellows program), introduced by Senators 
Susan Collins (R-Maine), Claire McCaskill (D-Mo.), and Bob Bennett (R-
Utah) shortly before this chapter was completed.
v. MAJoR SYSTeMS: MAJoR CHAnGe?
A. The Tanker Procurement: A Continuing Major System Ac-
quisition Case Study. Last year, we noted that the Obama administra-
tion would inherit one of the hottest potatoes imaginable—the future of 
in-flight refueling for the Air Force. This incredibly important, high-profile 
procurement has attracted (and, frankly, merited) extraordinary atten-
tion. Alas, we are not optimistic about the current request for proposals. 
Indeed, we think Ralph Nash got it right:
[We previously] criticized the Air Force for structuring the 
procurement … as a paper competition when it could have used 
the money to buy prototypes and conduct a fly-off to determine 
which prototype was better. ... Now the Air Force is starting 
over again and guess what[?] … conducting a better paper 
competition!
***
[T]his is the wrong way to procure an aircraft that is based 
on an aircraft that already exists. The right way to do it is 
to give each company half of the development funds to build 
prototypes and conduct a fly-off to see which prototype is the 
best plane. At the same time the fly-off is being conducted, the 
companies could submit firm prices based on the data that 
have been gathered building the prototypes – giving some 
assurance that the prices were realistic. Further, the millions 
of dollars of company money spent on preparing proposals and 
participating in the paper competition could be used to design 
and build the prototypes.
Ralph C. Nash, Dateline, 23 N&CR (November 2009). We will go one bet-
ter. Why not give the two major players funds to provide two prototypes 
each – one large, one smaller. Then deploy the four tankers – for a year or 
even longer – and let the end users weigh in. Imagine an outcome where 
both pricing and technical performance are based on experience! Not to 
belabor the point, but DoD’s latest guidance seems to agree. See, Ashton 
B. Carter, DUSD(AT&L), Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 09-027 - 
Implementation of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 
(December 4, 2009), directing that:
Program acquisition strategies for Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs (MDAPs) shall describe the measures taken to ensure 
competition or the option of competition, at both the prime and 
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subcontract level throughout the program life cycle. Measures 
may include, if cost-effective: competitive prototyping; dual-
sourcing ….
Is that: “do as I say, not as I do?” Or is it a concession that doing the right 
thing is rarely “cost-effective” in the short-run? See, generally, Northrop 
Threatens To Quit KC-X Procurement, Seeks Favorable Terms, 51 GC ¶ 425; 
USD AT&L Addresses KC-X Procurement, JSF at Media Roundtable, 51 
GC ¶ 417 (“DoD knows ‘very well what aircraft the warfighter wants, [and] 
what kind of requirements there are,’ which allowed for a ‘crystal-clear’ 
draft RFP. … [T]the source selection strategy is ‘much less subjective’”). 
B. A Less Detailed, More Proactive Agenda. One of us recently 
offered what we perceive as five key elements, which, if present, would 
lead to improvement in defense acquisition and permit the government 
to expect better performance at more predictable and stable prices.
1. Restoring DoD’s acquisition workforce capability is critical; of 
course, this will take sustained effort over time.
2. Competition is critical; we need to foster more of it.
3. Programs need clear requirements, better cost estimates, and 
more mature technology.
4. Requirements should not be locked in. Contract solicitations and 
negotiations need to focus more on tradeoffs of requirements, 
cost, and schedule. Secretary Gates’ 75% solution, achieved 
faster and at less cost, demands flexible requirements. Achieving 
success also demands stronger negotiating teams on the govern-
ment side, as well as a willingness to avoid taking the easy way 
out by picking companies who “buy in” to contract award.
5. It will take more time up front (for requirements, cost estimat-
ing, technology maturity, and negotiations) to do this better, but 
that will pay off in the long run.
David J. Berteau, Statement before the House Armed Services Commit-
tee, If These Are Such Good Ideas, Why Are They So Hard To Implement? 
(April 30, 2009); see also Business Executives for National Security, Get-
ting to Best: Reforming the Defense Acquisition Enterprise (July 2009), 
www.bens.org/our-work/policy-agenda/defense-acquisition-new.html 
([A] recent effort counted … some 262 relevant studies, reports, and pub-
lications … developed and presented on this issue since the landmark 
Goldwater-Nichols legislation of 1986. … [A]ll of them urged significant 
reform to the nation’s defense acquisition system. Looking even further 
back, … the Hoover study of 1949, the Fitzhugh Commission of 1970, the 
DeLauer panel of 1978, and the Packard report of 1986 (which led to the 
Goldwater-Nichols reforms), all … made similar pleas.)
It may be premature to conclude that major change has come to the 
major systems acquisition regime, despite the good intentions behind the 
Weapons Systems Acquisitions Reform Act (WSARA). President Signs 
Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act, 51 GC ¶ 184; HASC Marks Up 
Weapons Acquisition Reform Act, 51 GC ¶ 152; House Budget Committee 
Reviews DOD Weapon System Procurement, 51 GC ¶ 96; SASC Considers 
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New Weapon Acquisition Bill, 51 GC ¶ 80; Systemic Problems Continue to 
Dog Weapons Acquisitions, GAO Says, 51 GC ¶ 61; Vernon J. Edwards & 
Ralph C. Nash, The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009: An 
Empty Vessel, 23 N&CR ¶ 38 (“Frustrated by program outcomes and its 
own impotence, and self-deluded or dishonest about its own contributions 
to the problems, Congress scans Government Accountability Office and 
agency Inspector General reports, holds hearings, pontificates, lectures, 
chastises, and then enacts legislation.”). 
C. intriguing Anecdotes. We hope that poignant lessons learned 
from prior programs are not ignored.
[T]he A-12 default termination provides a fascinating example 
of the exceedingly high risk that is imposed on a contractor that 
signs a fixed-price contract to develop a new weapon system.... 
Contractors should adopt the Nancy Reagan solution—just say 
no.
Ralph C. Nash, Fixed-Price Research and Development Contracts: A Risk 
Too High, 23 N&CR ¶ 39; Report Parses Coast Guard’s Deepwater Acqui-
sition For Lessons, 51 GC ¶ 14 (Deepwater … offered the Coast Guard a 
political opportunity to gain greater interoperability with the Navy while 
serving as a pilot for other programs. … [A]fter a period of downsizing and 
retrenchment, the project offered the Coast Guard a chance to ‘serve as 
a model for engaging industry as a partner in lowering overall contract-
ing costs by transferring more contract management responsibilities to 
the vendor.’ … Deepwater ‘catapulted the Coast Guard to the forefront of 
contracting and systems engineering practice and … exposed the Coast 
Guard … to significant risk.’”); Trevor L. Brown, David M. Van Slyke & 
Matthew Potoski, The Challenge of Contracting for Large Complex Projects: 
A Case Study of the Coast Guard’s Deepwater Program, www.businessof-
government.org/pdfs/BrownReport.pdf.
D. oCi’s: Reversing the “Last Supper.” We are not alone in wonder-
ing whether Northrop Grumman’s sale of TASC, a government consulting 
division, to comply with the WSARA’s new organizational conflict of interest 
(OCI) requirements is an isolated incident or a harbinger. Northrop CEO 
Ronald Sugar explained that the sale “reflects Northrop Grumman’s desire 
to align quickly” with the new WSARA OCI standards. DoD has until March 
2010 to propose rules governing how contractors that provide advisory 
services and develop weapon systems should deal with such conflicts. See, 
generally, Industry and Watchdog Organizations Comment on DOD OCI 
Requirements, 51 GC ¶ 426; Ralph C. Nash, Postscript(s) II and III: Organi-
zational Conflicts of Interest, 23 N&CR ¶¶ 65, 60 (“The … statutes … make 
no allowance for firewalls between a division of a company providing support 
services and a division producing products or performing contract work. 
They … seem to assume that there should be an absolute ban on divisions 
of the same company performing these two types of effort. This will be the 
most difficult issue when the statutes are implemented.”). At a DoD public 
meeting to discuss OCIs, the Professional Services Council’s Alan Chvotkin, 
called for “a balanced approach that recognizes the symbiotic partnership 
that must exist for success.” We concur.
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vi. ConTinGenCY ConTRACTinG: iRAQ, AFGHAniSTAn, 
AnD PRivATe SeCURiTY
The fundamental issue facing [DoD] “after more than eight 
years of war is that it still does not have a coherent system for 
addressing the urgent needs of operational commanders in the 
field….” The procurement system “simply is not agile enough to 
enable commanders to respond quickly, and in the most effective 
way possible, to the demands for countering” unanticipated 
battlefield developments such as the use of improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs). The enemy “employs easily obtainable, off-the-
shelf technology to undermine the effectiveness of U.S. military 
operations….” “Yet DoD has made no permanent institutional 
changes in its acquisition, programmatic and budgetary systems 
to account for the growing sophistication and flexibility of the 
threat.”
Dov Zakheim, former defense undersecretary (comptroller), October 8, 
2009 testimony before the House Armed Services Committee. Defense 
Acquisition Reform Panel Acknowledges Success, Considers Rapid Acqui-
sition, 51 GC ¶ 392.
Three traits define post-9/11 war-time field contracts: they are 
located in Iraq (55% of overall); they are undertaken by the 
U.S. Army (70% of overall); and they are for providing logistics 
and infrastructure (69% of identified services). Since 2005 
Afghanistan, which has a higher ratio of civilian spending, 
is receiving more dollars but even after three years of steady 
growth that theater only obtained 24% of 2008 field contracts. 
Policy changes [such as the recent legislative] mandate that core 
aspects of interrogation of the military’s prisoners be handled 
by government personnel, may decrease reliance on contractors 
in specific areas. However, the broader dependence on logistics 
contractors is unlikely to change absent a major reduction in 
demand for field services.
Gregory Sanders, Current Issues: No. 17: Contracting for Operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan (11/05/2009), CSIS, Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group, 
http://csis.org/files/publication/091105_DIIG_Current_Issues_n17.pdf.
The most intriguing question, at a macro level, is whether the Afghani-
stan experience will demonstrate that, institutionally, the government 
learned from, or simply repeated, its Iraq experience. See, generally, State’s 
Reliance on Security Contractors Continues to Grow, GAO Says, 51 GC 
¶ 428; DOD IG Focuses on Force Protection, Fuel Procurement in Contin-
gency Operations, 51 GC ¶ 427; DOD IG Recommends Better Management 
of Commercial Vehicle Acquisitions in Iraq, 51 GC ¶ 419; Contracting 
Committee Mulls Federal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Contractors, 51 GC 
¶ 405; CWC Revisits DCMA, DCAA And Contractor Business Systems, 51 
GC ¶ 399; SIGIR Recommends Better DOD Management of Iraq Develop-
ment Fund, 51 GC ¶ 392; DOD IG Finds LOGCAP Transition Planning 
Weaknesses, 51 GC ¶ 344; CWC Focuses on State Department Contractor 
Employee Misconduct, 51 GC ¶ 328; ABA Recommends Uniform PSC Rules, 
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51 GC ¶ 314; CWC Scrutinized Translation Contract, 51 GC ¶ 299; CWC 
Assesses Contractor Business Systems, 51 GC ¶ 298; New Rapid Response 
Acquisition Agency Needed, DSB Task Force Says, 51 GC ¶ 246; Army 
Contracts for NTVs Used in Afghanistan Need More Oversight, 51 GC 
¶ 215; CWC Testifies on the Path Forward in Iraq, Afghanistan, 51 GC 
¶ 205; House Bill to Reform PSC Oversight Introduced, 51 GC ¶ 161; LOG-
CAP IV Still Faces Challenges, CWC Finds, 51 GC ¶ 161; DCMA Should 
Tighten CAS, FAR Controls for Iraq Reconstruction, IG Finds, 51 GC 
¶ 138; Commission on Wartime Contracting Holds First Hearing, 51 GC 
¶ 41; Ralph C. Nash, Postscript: Contractor’s Tort Liability for Battlefield 
Conduct, 23 N&CR ¶ 57.
incremental Progress: Transparency into Contractor Fatalities 
and injuries. Last year, we expressed frustration that contractor fatali-
ties (and injuries) remained generally outside the public’s consciousness. 
We believe that, in a representative democracy, public awareness of the 
human cost of our nation’s security and foreign policies is critical. We are 
encouraged that the government has begun to at least keep track. GAO’s 
John Hutton explained: “Reliable, meaningful data on contractors and the 
services they provide are necessary to inform agency decisions on when and 
how to effectively use contractors, provide support services to contractors, 
and ensure that contractors are properly managed and overseen[.]” And, 
while we might be disappointed with the Synchronized Predeployment 
and Operational Tracker (SPOT) database concept and implementation, 
we commend the Labor Department for a giant step towards transparency. 
See, generally, www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/lsdbareports.htm. The Labor 
Department recently began posting on the Internet the data it gener-
ates based upon claims filed under the Defense Base Act, and the War 
Hazards Compensation Act, which make contractor employees eligible for 
worker’s compensation benefits pursuant to the Longshore and Harbor 
Workers’ Compensation Act. Remember Them, Too: Don’t Contractors 
Count When We Calculate the Costs of War? WashInGton Post A21 (May 
25, 2009); DOD, State, USAID Need Timeframe for SPOT Database, 51 
GC ¶ 392; Government Continues to Implement Contractor Database in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, 51 GC ¶ 118 (“DOD has entered around 70 percent of 
its contractor population”).
vii. THe ToXiC enviRonMenT
Last year, we reprinted a seemingly incendiary quote suggesting that it 
had “become almost impossible to open a newspaper and not read of some 
well-connected and obscenely compensated contractor foisting a colossal 
botch on the taxpayer.” Thomas Frank, Government by Contractor Is a 
Disgrace, Wall st. J. (Nov. 25, 2008). We noted that this public percep-
tion is widely accepted and, in large part, seems to have been embraced 
by the incoming administration. We find this caricature not conducive to 
meaningful discourse, and we continue to wait for the administration to 
soften its stance. At a recent not-for-attribution discussion, a retired se-
nior official noted that: “Contractor fraud, waste, and abuse is to the left 
what ‘welfare queens’ are to the right.” That seems no less apt than Jack 
Gansler’s popular new moniker for the current environment: the “Global 
War on Contractors.” 
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A casual observer should be forgiven for concluding that procurement 
policy today is being driven primarily by the inspector general and audit 
community. DPAPSS Addresses DCAA Criticism, 51 GC ¶ 364; Congress, 
GAO Call for Reform at DCAA, 51 GC ¶ 333; Industry Questions DCAA 
Approach to Audit of Compliance With Mandatory Disclosure Rule, 51 GC 
¶ 234; Experts Tell House Subcommittee About Federal Contracting Chal-
lenges, 51 GC ¶ 213 (Karen Manos noted that DCAA “has adopted aggressive 
new audit policies that are wreaking havoc on the Government procure-
ment world.” DCAA has strayed from its primary mission, “and appears 
to be focusing its efforts on ‘systems’ audits that are time-consuming and 
disruptive and often have little if anything to do with actually protecting 
the Government against unallowable costs[.]”); IGs Offer Suggestions For 
Increased Contractor Oversight, 51 GC ¶ 145; GAO Finds Weaknesses In 
DOD Professional and Management Support Contracts, 51 GC ¶ 415; Many 
Contractors Had Acceptable Ethics Programs Before New FAR Requirements, 
GAO Finds, 51 GC ¶ 346; Cutting Contracting Waste Would Save Tax Dol-
lars, Obama Tells VFW, 51 GC ¶ 308; Robert L. Vogel, Feature Comment: 
The 2009 Amendments to the FCA, 51 GC ¶ 342 (The Fraud Enforcement 
and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA) “expanded the substantive liability pro-
visions of the Act to cover situations that were not [previously] covered … 
[and] expanded the Government’s ability to use powerful civil discovery 
devices, civil investigative demands (CIDs), before deciding whether to 
initiate a lawsuit under the FCA or to intervene in a qui tam lawsuit….”); 
Laura Laemmie-Weidenfeld & Michael Schaengold, Feature Comment: The 
Impact of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 On the Civil 
False Claims Act, 51 GC ¶ 224; New Legislation Aims to Toughen FCA, 
Anti-Fraud Laws, 51 GC ¶ 151; Steven L. Briggerman, False Claims Act 
Amendments: A Major Expansion in the Scope of the Act, 23 N&CR ¶ 58; 
Agencies Face Challenges Implementing Recovery Act Provisions, IGS Say, 
51 GC ¶ 145; Ralph C. Nash, Suspension and Debarment: Protecting the 
Government By Denying Due Process to Contractors, 23 N&CR ¶ 36, discuss-
ing, Todd J. Canni, Shoot First, Ask Questions Later: An Examination and 
Critique of Suspension and Debarment Practice Under the FAR, Including 
a Discussion of the Mandatory Disclosure Rule, the IBM Suspension, and 
Other Noteworthy Developments, 38 PUB. Cont. l.J. 547 (2009); Steven L. 
Briggerman, The Demise of Voluntary Government Contract Compliance 
and Disclosure Programs: The New Requirement, 23 N&CR ¶ 11.
Particularly given the perceived failure of the free market in the 
financial and mortgage industries, contractors increasingly are vilified, 
and resources are shifted from pursuing value-based outcomes to creat-
ing compliance and risk avoidance regimes. That may be understandable, 
but, at a macro level, it is an inefficient over-reaction. The United States 
enjoys one of the world’s best public procurement regimes. Government 
customers enjoy excellent value for taxpayer money. Contractors provide 
extraordinary levels of support, particularly in extreme conditions such 
as in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Quite simply, there are significant costs associated with sophisticated 
rule-based procurement regimes, their resulting compliance programs, and 
the audit, oversight, and prosecutorial functions required to validate and 
sustain them. While a successful procurement regime depends upon high 
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standards of integrity and compliance, a pervasive “corruption control” 
focus not only stifles creativity and encourages mechanical rule adher-
ence, but encourages timidity and risk-averse behavior. Steve Kelman 
hits close to the mark in fretting that public managers (or procurement 
professionals) over the next decade:
[r]ather than transforming, learning, and challenging themselves 
… could be preoccupied with ‘ferreting’ out waste, fraud and 
abuse, … ‘exposing mismanagement’, … ‘complying with rules 
and procedures’ … in a mode of ‘hunkering down’ and ‘keeping 
out of trouble[.]’
Donald Kettl & Steven Kelman, Reflections on 21st Century Government 
Management, IBM Center for the Business of Government, www.busi-
nessofgovernment.org/pdfs/KettlKelmanReport.pdf. That can’t be the 
procurement regime our government aspires to foster. 
viii. PRoFeSSionALiSM, eTHiCS, AnD CoMMon SenSe
We remain surprised, disappointed, and, ultimately flummoxed by 
the increasing message that government acquisition professionals have 
heard from their leadership and ethics advisors: specifically, that partici-
pation – and even membership – in relevant professional development 
organizations may run afoul of government ethics rules. This advice is 
not only wrong, but wrong-headed. And the timing – as the government 
attempts to recruit the next generation of acquisition professionals – could 
not be worse. Fortunately, the National Contract Management Association 
(NCMA) sought advice of the Office of Government Ethics (OGE) and DoD’s 
director of standards of conduct (SOCO). The result is an Open Letter to 
Government Employees: Becoming Engaged with NCMA Enhances Pro-
fessionalism and Mission Success (November 7, 2009), available at www.
ncmahq.org/News/CMNewsDetail.cfm?ItemNumber=6293. (“NCMA … 
provide[s a] … neutral environment where professionals from govern-
ment and industry can come together to discuss, analyze, and advance 
the state of the contract management profession.”) Hopefully, this effort 
will remove doubt that government employees may (1) become members 
of NCMA; (2) attend and participate in educational NCMA conferences, 
workshops, or meetings; (3) participate in the management of NCMA 
at the local or national level; (4) present an educational briefing to an 
NCMA conference, workshop, or meeting, (5) “use … government e-mail 
for simple communications ([although] not … endorsement[s]) to forward 
announcements of NCMA educational events since such announcements 
serve the common interests of government acquisition professionals in a 
manner that is consistent with DOD Joint Ethics Regulation paragraph 
3-208[,]” and (6) accept cash awards under awards programs adminis-
tered by NCMA. Of course: “OGE went on to say that there may indeed 
be circumstances where it would be wise for individual employees to seek 
legal advice regarding unique circumstances applicable to their particular 
professional responsibilities.” 
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